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THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER 
YUGOSLAVIA: THE PROMISE AND REALITY OF 
RECONCILIATION IN CROATIA 
 
 
Sara Parker 
 
The international community is increasingly interested in promoting post-
conflict reconciliation in a variety of forms, with trials and truth commissions 
featured most prominently. The contemporary academic discussion over 
transitional justice (and the practice of transitional justice itself) is largely 
focused on whether and how these types of large-scale national transitional 
justice mechanisms contribute to reconciliation. This article examines the 
promise and reality of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) to contribute to national reconciliation. Ultimately, the 
ability of state-wide policies to contribute to reconciliation rests on the active 
participation of local level actors. This requires political backing at the state 
and local level beyond that of just the international community. More 
attention needs to be paid to domestic cultural factors in the initial decision to 
implement state-wide transitional justice procedures, and bottom-up 
mechanisms must be built into any large scale approach to reconciliation. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
When you work on producing conflict you work on a general level … The 
recipe for violence is always the same … If you work on reconciliation, you 
must work on a personal level. (NGO worker in Vukovar, Croatia) 
 
At the end of conflict, how can transitional justice and reconciliation be 
achieved? Agreement barely exists over the definitions of these terms, much 
less agreement on how they can be accomplished. Yet, interest in, and 
attention to, these topics continue to grow. Kaminski et al. (2006) define 
transitional justice as the formal and informal procedures implemented by a 
group or institution around the time of transition out of an oppressive or 
violent social order for rendering justice to perpetrators, collaborators, and 
victims. Lederach (1997, p. 27) defines reconciliation as “the point of 
encounter where concerns about both the past and the future can meet”; a 
point where truth, justice, mercy and peace convene. Other authors have aptly 
described reconciliation as an “opening”, a time or a space where a 
willingness to work towards this point exists (Doxtader, 2001).  
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The two transitional justice mechanisms that feature most prominently 
in the discussion are trials, whether domestic or international, and truth 
commissions. Both of these mechanisms are implemented at the state level. 
Other state-wide transitional justice options include instituting or upholding 
amnesties, providing reparations, or utilizing purges (also known as 
lustration). As an additional number of states started to implement truth 
commissions in the 1990s, a “truth vs. justice” debate emerged in which the 
positive and negative attributes of truth commissions began to be examined 
against the positive and negative attributes of trials (see Rotberg and 
Thompson, 2000; Minow, 1998; Méndez, 1997). According to Leebaw (2003, 
p. 27), “morally, prosecutions were viewed as unambiguously superior to 
truth commissions, and to other forms of transitional justice”. In response, 
advocates of truth commissions sought to build a case for their superiority in 
comparison with trials. By the mid 1990s, “human rights advocates and 
scholars increasingly began to argue that many of the dilemmas once 
associated with transitional justice were based on false dichotomies and 
limited thinking about the range of forms transitional justice might take” 
(Leebaw, 2008, p. 102). Both trials and truth commissions are currently 
promoted as uniquely important elements of transitional justice and there is an 
emerging scholarship on how trials and truth commissions can co-exist 
(Schabas, 2003; Kelsall, 2005; O’Flaherty, 2004; Hannum, 2006; Lanegran, 
2005).  
Regardless of whether trials, truth commissions, or a hybrid of both are 
used, the contemporary discussion over transitional justice (and the practice of 
transitional justice itself) largely focuses on whether and how large scale 
national transitional justice mechanisms contribute to reconciliation. 
Furthermore, both of these mechanisms have become increasingly 
institutionalized in international organizations that help states to implement 
them. This has led to a standardization of how trials and truth commissions 
operate, making culturally dependant adaptations difficult.  
While the academic literature recognizes the relevance of civil society 
and the importance of culturally-sensitive programs in the quest for 
transitional justice and reconciliation, this has not resulted in adequate 
incorporation of these programs into national level mechanisms. In this paper, 
I argue that the initial promise that the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) would be able to promote societal reconciliation in 
Croatia was largely undermined by the fact that there was no discussion or 
plan on how to incorporate bottom-up approaches into national-scale policy 
decisions. More attention must be paid to domestic cultural factors in the 
initial decision to implement state-wide transitional justice procedures, 
whether a truth commission, a trial, or something else. In addition, regardless 
of what mechanism(s) are chosen (and choice is likely to be highly 
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restrained), there must be a plan for local participation. Ultimately the ability 
of state-wide policies to contribute to reconciliation rests on the active 
participation of local level actors. This requires political backing at the state 
and local level beyond that of just the international community.  
This article proceeds by first examining the decision to implement the 
International Tribunal and Croatia’s record of cooperation with the Tribunal. 
A lack of cooperation on the part of the Croatian government is not surprising 
given the lack of attention that was paid to the cultural appropriateness and 
practicality of utilizing this mechanism in the first place. In the second 
section, I look at the initial belief that the ICTY would be able to contribute to 
reconciliation processes. In the third section I show that this has not been the 
case. Whether the consequence of lack of will, lack of foresight, or lack of 
adequate international pressure and support, the failure of the Croatian 
government to integrate locally based efforts into the national reconciliation 
plan only made the challenge of reconciliation via the Tribunal more difficult. 
In the last section I highlight the benefits that can be gained by incorporating 
grassroots activism into any national plan to promote effective reconciliation. 
Throughout, I offer anecdotal evidence based on field research conducted in 
eastern Croatia in the summer of 2005 to substantiate my suggestions.1 This 
case illustrates the need to widen the discussion on transitional justice to 
include a dialogue on how state level mechanisms can incorporate bottom-up 
reconciliation practices.  
 
 
Establishment of the ICTY 
 
Punishment dominates our contemporary conception of transitional 
justice (Teitel, 2000). The trial, with its emphasis on retribution, prosecution 
and justice, is perhaps the best recognized mechanism for dealing with past 
abuse. The suggested benefits of prosecution include: enhancing the prospects 
for solidifying the rule of law, educating citizens about the wrongs of the past, 
identifying victims for compensation, punishing those responsible, deterring 
future violations, and healing societal wounds (Landsman, 1996). “It has been 
argued that society cannot forgive what it cannot punish. If that argument is 
correct, the first real step to restoring social harmony comes with prosecution” 
(Landsman, 1996, p. 84). Along with the prosecution of individuals in state-
run trials, international tribunals have gained popularity with the 
establishment of the ICTY and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR), International Criminal Court, Special Courts in Sierra Leone and 
Cambodia, and the Iraq Tribunal (see Meron, 2006 for a discussion on the 
evolution of International Tribunals).  
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The ICTY was created through Security Council Resolution 827 in 1993 
outside the purview of the Croatian government. It can be viewed as the result 
of a trend (one that began with the Nuremberg trials) towards holding national 
leaders responsible for abuses committed while they were in power. “Not only 
did the [Nuremberg] tribunal reject the fiction that leaders acted on behalf of 
their societies and therefore should be immune from punishment, but in 
prosecuting the crime of aggression, it discarded the assumption that the 
decision to go to war was a state prerogative beyond normative scrutiny” 
(Thomas, 2005, p. 30). Aldana-Pindell (2004, p. 67) calls the culmination of 
this trend the “duty to prosecute norm”, which “requires states to conduct an 
effective criminal investigation and prosecution with the aim of punishing 
those responsible for right to life and humane treatment violations”. As Roht-
Arriaza and Gibson (1998, p. 843) point out, “anti-impunity measures are no 
longer simply a question of national choice”. 
Prior to the creation of the ICTY and ICTR, Nuremburg (and to a lesser 
extent the Tokyo trial), was the pivotal example of justice at work. “The 
Nuremburg trials were to be a history lesson, then, as well as a symbolic 
punishment of all the German people—a moral lesson cloaked in all the 
ceremonial trappings of due legal process” (Buruma, 2002, p. 145). The ICTY 
was seen as an improvement over Nuremberg (which is often described as 
“victors’ justice”) because it was implemented prior to the resolution of 
conflict and because it required Croatia to try its own citizens, i.e. to practice 
“victims’ justice” (Scheffer, 1996).  
The decision to create the ICTY was not a response to the specific 
demands of Croatia’s situation, but a foreign-imposed decision that appeased 
an international normative demand for justice. The ICTY gained a reputation 
of having come into existence to assuage Western powers’ guilt for their own 
failure to prevent the atrocities: “At the time of its establishment, rather than 
being universally hailed as a moral triumph, the ICTY was derided by some 
observers as an act of hypocrisy” (Akhavan, 1998, p. 744). Talk of a truth 
commission circulated sporadically, but never gained mass backing in 
Croatia. The idea may have originally been thwarted by the concern that 
revelations could undermine the historic International Tribunal. Today, there 
continue to be efforts to promote such commissions throughout the region. 2  
The Croatian government did support the creation of the court, and has 
pressured the court to prosecute Serbs. However, the government has also 
fought for immunity for Croatians accused of war crimes (Peskin and 
Boduszyński, 2003). Although Croatia’s cooperation with the ICTY has 
steadily improved since its inception, this cooperation should not be seen as 
indicative that either the government or Croatian citizens support the trials. 
Peskin and Boduszyński (2003, p. 1117) argue that, “no issue has polarized 
the post-authoritarian Croatian political scene as much as the issue of 
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cooperation”. The premature death of President Franjo Tudjman (and the 
failure of the Court to indict him prior to his death) prevented Croatia from 
outright denouncing the Court. Consecutive governments since Tudjman’s 
death have found themselves caught politically between support (or at least 
cooperation) and opposition to the ICTY. On the one hand, the Tribunal offers 
the potential to vindicate Croatia’s steadfast position as having been 
victimized by Serb aggression. Cooperation also bodes well for Croatia’s EU 
accession process (Cruvellier and Valiñas, 2006; Peskin and Boduszyński, 
2003). On the other hand, cooperation requires turning over Croats at The 
Hague’s request – in effect an admission that Croats had actually committed 
war crimes and that alleged crimes were not merely defensive acts. 
Since full statehood status was granted in 1998, the Croatian 
cooperation record has varied. In some cases, wanted criminals turned 
themselves in and in other cases threats from the World Bank were required 
before Croatia agreed to comply (Sharp, 1997).3 An overall positive 
evaluation on compliance in various international appraisals has been 
consistently overshadowed by a perceived lack of diligence on the part of the 
Croatian government in tracking down a few high level Croatian Army 
officials, and due to the strong public reactions opposing the extradition of 
these individuals. Peskin and Boduszyński (2003, p. 1121) write: “Its 
assistance to tribunal investigators and prosecutors notwithstanding, the 
Croatian government has appeared increasingly hesitant to comply with its 
international legal obligations when it comes to the biggest tests of 
cooperation – the arrest of indicted war suspects and their transfer to The 
Hague”. Only when threatened with EU refusal to initiate accession talks did 
Croatian authorities begin to adopt “a more pragmatic, if ambivalent, 
approach” (Cruvellier and Valiñas, 2006, p. 7).  
Overall, “Croatian authorities have sent inconsistent messages to the 
public regarding war crimes, and the European Commission has described 
Croatia’s attitude towards the ICTY as ‘lukewarm’” (Zoglin, 2005, p. 58). 
The public has responded negatively to the Tribunal based on the perception 
that it is anti-Croat, despite the fact that the most of the cases for crimes 
committed in Croatian territory have been against Serbs (Cruvellier and 
Valiñas, 2006). Although it was originally assumed that the ICTY would 
contribute to societal reconciliation, there was little thought given as to what 
this process would actually entail.  
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The Promise of Reconciliation 
 
Despite its lukewarm reception, advocates of the ICTY nonetheless 
initially believed that the justice doled out by the Tribunal could offer a path 
to reconciliation. This expectation was based on the assumption that justice 
and peace necessarily complement one another. As Scheffer (1996, p. 34), a 
former senior advisor and counsel to the U.S. permanent advisor to the U.N. 
put it: “We are finally learning that the pursuit of peace can coexist with the 
search for justice and that the pursuit of justice is often a prerequisite for 
lasting peace”. It was believed that the use of legal mechanisms to bring 
perpetrators to justice was not just as a putative means of addressing human 
transgressions, but a symbol of justice, and therefore, a burden-lifting 
experience for witnesses and a necessary component for peace (Rudolph, 
2001).  
There is an assumed link between criminal procedures, whether on an 
international or a national scale, and healing on an individual level (Fletcher 
and Weinstein, 2002). Snyder and Vinjamuri (2003) make three claims about 
the effectiveness of trials in this regard. First, they argue, trials send a signal 
to potential perpetrators of atrocities that they will be held individually 
accountable. In other words, trials have deterrent value. Secondly, trials are 
seen as having the effect of strengthening the rule of law and establishing 
justice. Lastly, trials emphasize the guilt of individuals, thereby defusing the 
potential for future violence. International tribunals (as opposed to domestic 
ones) are particularly presented as facilitators of reconciliation due to their 
rarity, international scale, and higher standards of neutrality. In addition to the 
tangible products international tribunals produce – perpetrators behind bars, 
court transcripts and witness testimony, and proof that humanitarian norms 
are relevant – there is a belief that, “individual accountability for massive 
crimes is an essential part of a preventative strategy and, thus, a realistic 
foundation for lasting peace” (Akhayam, 2001, p. 10).  
The association between peace, justice, and reconciliation was 
automatically assumed in the case of the ICTY. The United Nations ICTY 
website describes the trials as paving “the way for the reconciliation process 
within the war-torn societies of the former Yugoslavia”. Speaking on the same 
subject, former U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright stated that, “in the 
end, it is very difficult to have peace and reconciliation without justice” 
(Rudolph, 2001, p.  656). This understanding “was subsequently echoed by 
leading members of the ICTY itself and became a central component of its 
ideology” (Akhavan, 1998, p. 756). For instance, following the passing of 
Security Council Resolution 1503, which implemented a completion strategy 
for the ICTY, Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte stated in an Address to the 
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U.N. Security Council on October 9, 2003: “By completing these 
investigations, ICTY will have proven that it worked impartially towards 
achieving justice, peace and reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia”.  
 
 
The Reality of Reconciliation 
 
Unfortunately, at this point in time, the promise of the ICTY to promote 
reconciliation has been largely discredited. As Akhavan (1998, p. 770) notes: 
“Of course, even if the ICTY can establish a factual record of what happened, 
it cannot contribute to national reconciliation if this record is not recognized 
and internalized by the peoples of the former Yugoslavia”.  
An outreach office was created in 1999 through voluntary country 
donations. According to the ICTY website, it was meant “to bridge the divide 
separating the organisation in The Hague from the communities it serves in 
the states and territories that have emerged from former Yugoslavia”. This 
was, perhaps, the most direct attempt to increase the Tribunal’s ability to 
reach the Croatian public. Given that the trials were being held in The Hague 
and were very much removed from the daily lives of the average Croatian, 
this was an important step. Yet, the office is located at the outskirts of Zagreb 
behind barbed wire and guarded walls and is staffed by only one outreach 
officer. As the picture below shows, a cryptic graffiti of the word “Vukovar”, 
referring to the eastern town held under siege by Serb forces and a symbol of 
the atrocities committed in Croatia, marks a wall protecting the facility (see 
Figure 1, below).  
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Information about the trials in general has been poorly disseminated:  
To the extent that peoples in the former Yugoslavia are denied access to the 
proceedings of the ICTY, the truth exposed through the judicial process may 
have no appreciable impact on interethnic reconciliation. Despite the 
importance attached to this truth-telling function, the proceedings of the ICTY 
remain somewhat inaccessible to peoples of the former Yugoslavia (Akhavan, 
1998, p. 793).  
The outreach office never made a valid effort to reach the Croatian 
people and explain what they were doing. In contrast to Bosnia and Serbia, 
ICTY hearings have not been broadcast in full on Croatian TV. “This has 
made it easier for politicians to manipulate popular perceptions of the 
process” (Cruvellier and Valiñas, 2006). According to Dr. Charles Tauber 
(2009), Head of Mission for Southeastern Europe of The Coalition for Work 
with Psychotrauma and Peace: “There was – and is – massive opposition by 
the politicians, not only to the ICTY but to any form of possible 
reconciliation. Nationalism still serves virtually all of the politicians of 
whatever ethnicity and thus reconciliation is counterproductive for them”. 
The reaction in 2007 to the ICTY verdict that convicted Mile Mrkšić 
and Veselin Šljivančanin, former senior officers in the Yugoslav People’s 
Army, exemplified this tension. Mrkšić was sentenced to 20 years, and 
Šljivančanin to five years for their role in the murder and torture of over 200 
Croat prisoners held in a Vukovar hospital. The third man accused was 
acquitted by the Tribunal Chamber. The rulings set off a widespread reaction 
among the public, who took to the streets to protest. The government 
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supported their reaction; the following day, Prime Minster Sanadaer 
condemned the verdict as a defeat for the Court, and sent a letter to the U.N. 
General Secretary expressing his “disappointment and consternation” with the 
“shameful ruling” (OSCE Spot Report, 2007).  
Coinciding with the strong reaction the court has at times elicited among 
the Croatian public (one that has been encouraged by politicians and the 
media), there is also widespread disinterest in the Tribunal. For example, in 
July 2005, the head of the city council in Osijek (the largest city in eastern 
Croatia) came under scrutiny after allegations of war crimes surfaced. A poll 
conducted by the newspaper Glas Slavonje on July 31, 2005 found that 81 
percent of respondents (all of whom were self-subscribers to the poll) 
believed the issue should not be pursued, reinforcing the impression that 
“many, if not most people, in Osijek and the rest of Croatia regarded Glavaš 
as a hero, not as a criminal”. The same summer, the Ovčara trial began, yet 
coverage was far from front-page news.4 Because most of the news in Croatia 
since 1991 has revolved around war topics, said the founder of a local Serb 
radio station, “people are sick of it” (interview with author, 27 July 2005). An 
assistant at the ICTY outreach center expressed concern that all interest in the 
trial would cease to exist once Croatia definitively secured EU accession 
(interview with author, 15 July 2005). Perhaps more realistically, many 
simply do not acknowledge the relevance of the ICTY to their own lives. 
Stover (2004) looked at evidence to evaluate whether the ICTY was 
able to effectively connect with the public through those who had actually 
testified at the Tribunal. He found that courtrooms are, by nature, neither safe 
nor secure environments for recounting dramatic events. His study of 87 
ICTY witnesses found that those who expected to receive appreciation from 
the lawyers were let down, cathartic feelings often faded upon their return to 
shattered communities, and witnesses experienced feelings of “helplessness, 
abandonment, and anger” when light sentences were handed down. For many 
witnesses, testifying “required an act of great courage”, yet the Tribunal 
statute does not grant victims or witnesses specific rights, and information 
about the protective measures offered were not appropriately provided 
(Stover, 2004). Witness protection is a matter of concern in Croatian war 
trials, as fear and intimidation remains high (Cruvellier and Valiñas, 2006). 
Witnesses who testify face vilification in their own communities. Stover 
(2004, p. 119) concluded: “If potential witnesses come to regard their 
treatment as demeaning, unfair, too remote, or little concerned with their 
rights and interests, this neglect may hinder the future cooperation of the very 
people we are trying to serve”. According to Tauber (2009), the ICTY has 
been so politicized by both sides that any cooperation is seen as quite risky 
and unsafe. 
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Fletcher and Weinstein (2002) argue that there is a communal 
engagement with mass violence left unaddressed by criminal trials. In their 
field research, they conducted interviews with judges and prosecutors in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and found that all three ethnic groups in Bosnia 
(Bosniaks, Croatians, and Serbs) saw themselves as victims (Fletcher and 
Weinstein, 2000). This is because international criminal trials can have the 
effect of stigmatizing ethnic groups (Fletcher and Weinstein, 2004). A study 
done by Meernik (2005) attempted to find empirical evidence to affirm or 
deny the impact of criminal arrests and judgments of war criminals on ethnic 
violence. His study was also carried out in Bosnia, where he found little 
evidence to suggest that the ICTY had any positive impact on societal peace, 
and in some cases it appeared that ICTY actions inflamed ethnic tensions 
rather than contributed to cooperation or reconciliation. The controversy over 
General Ante Gotovina suggests that these authors’ findings also hold true in 
Croatia.5  
Gotovina became a symbol of Croatia’s refusal to admit complicity in 
war crimes. In August 2000, a survey reported that over 78 percent of 
Croatian citizens “think that Croatia must not extradite its citizens if the 
Hague Tribunal requests it” and 60 percent polled believed the ICTY was 
“unfair” (Akhavan, 2001, p. 22). According to the article “No Gotovina, No 
Cash” in Transitions Online on March 21, 2005, polls put Croatian opposition 
to Gotovina’s extradition prior to his capture as high as 70 percent. After 
Gotovina was finally arrested in December 2005, the national championship 
football team pledged to donate proceeds from their last match of the 2006 
season to the Foundation for the Truth about the Homeland War, which raises 
money in support of Croats facing trial in The Hague; Gotovina was the 
presumed beneficiary (Hawton, 2006). Gotovina’s trial, along with two other 
Croatian army Generals (Ivan Cermak and Mladen Markac) opened in March 
2008. At that time, Merdijana Sadovic of the Institute for War and Peace 
Reporting suggested that the prevailing opinion in Croatia was that the 
Generals had been wrongly accused. In short, nationalist groups have been 
able to raise the cost of political cooperation by the Croatian government by 
“effectively designing a rhetorical strategy which equates the Tribunal’s 
indictments against Croatia’s war heroes with attacks on the dignity and 
legitimacy of the so-called Homeland war” (Peskin and Boduszyński, 2003, p. 
1117).  
Another attempt to make the ICTY more relevant for Croatians came in 
the form of a law passed in October 2003 that included provisions related to 
the transfer of proceedings from the ICTY to Croatia. It gave Croatia the 
ability to hear war crimes cases6 and outlined various mechanisms for moving 
them there.7 Trainings were instituted in May and June of 2004 to inform the 
Croatian judiciary of comparative aspects of Croatian and ICTY law (OSCE 
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Background Report). According to a report of the International Center for 
Transitional Justice, “monitoring organizations still consider the number and 
type of war crimes cases brought before Croatian courts to be unsatisfactory 
(cited in Cruvellier and Valiñas, 2006, p. 19). Zoglin (2005) highlights 
excessive trial delays, inefficiencies, unqualified staff, and a lack of political 
will and public support to try war criminals as major obstacles to Croatia’s 
ability to try their own cases. This fits well with the observation that “legalist 
tactics for strengthening human rights norms can backfire when institutional 
and social preconditions for the rule of law are lacking. In an institutional 
desert, legalism is likely to be either counterproductive or simply irrelevant” 
(Snyder and Vinjamuri, 2003, p. 12).  
That the ICTY has not been an effective means for societal 
reconciliation in Croatia is not an unexpected finding. We should continue to 
view war crimes trials as a valuable component of the transitional justice 
process. However, their utility in terms of reconciliation can only be evaluated 
in the context of receptivity in the communities they hope to reach. In Croatia, 
where strong existing nationalist sentiment was given a voice through trial 
indictments and verdicts, this notion was not adequately taken into account. 
Doing so would have required the Croatian government to have a plan to 
supplement activities in The Hague with local measures and the support of 
local actors also working on reconciliation. “As the ICTY has learned, trials 
do not exist in a vacuum and must be accompanied by public discussion and 
education” (Zoglin, 2005, p. 74). When the government is either unable or 
unwilling to initiate this discussion or enact programs to facilitate engagement 
with the trials in a way that might further societal reconciliation, that 
responsibility is left to local organizations.8  
 
 
The Importance of Incorporating Local Level Participation 
 
Generally speaking, scholars of international relations have begun to 
pay increasing attention to the role that non-state actors play in the 
international system (see, for example, Finnemore, 1996; Hall and Biersteker, 
2002; Risse-Kappen, 1995; Risse et al., 1999;). Non-governmental 
organizations are believed to occupy a primary role in world politics and 
domestic politics. They are frequently the main suppliers of services that 
governments are either unwilling or incapable of providing. Many provide 
social programs, advocate for underprivileged groups, and give attention to 
less “popular” issues on the national or international agenda. In this role, they 
form a link between the government, and the population.  
The term used to describe the existence of strong, permanent linkages is 
“civil society”. According to Belloni (2001, p. 168), civil society can be 
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understood as, “a sphere where the power of the state is limited by the 
capacity of individuals to organize themselves collectively”. Authors have 
clasped onto the idea that civil society enables states to jumpstart desirable 
processes such as democratic participation, respect for human rights, and 
enhancement of other global social norms such as environmental protection. 
The relevance (and importance) of grassroots activism in reconciliation 
processes has not been ignored. Over the last decade there has been a growing 
recognition and confidence in the potential for civil society to play an 
important role in deeply divided societies (Belloni, 2001).  
Locally-based programs, or grassroots approaches are often seen as 
promising for the promotion of reconciliation because they operate at the 
community level and are therefore more attuned to the unique demands of that 
community. Halpern and Weinstein (2004, p. 567) write: “To be effective, 
reconciliation must arguably begin at the level of the individual—neighbor to 
neighbor, then house to house, and finally, community to community”. Many 
authors are also in agreement that it is important to pay adequate attention to 
the unique cultural practices of the society in question when working towards 
reconciliation. For example, writing about the case of Sierra Leone, Shaw 
(2005) suggests that the goals of the national truth and reconciliation 
commission actually conflicted with cultural expectations of justice and 
reconciliation, perhaps even undermining its effectiveness. In another study 
on the effectiveness of the “truth-telling” objective in Sierra Leone’s truth and 
reconciliation commission, the author argues that truth was not told for a 
variety of reasons, one of which was due to the fact that “public truth-telling – 
in the absence of strong ritual inducement – lacks deep roots in the local 
cultures of Sierra Leone” (Kelsall, 2005, p. 363).  
Similarly, Theidon’s (2006, p. 456) field research in Peru leads her to 
conclude that “reconciliation is forged and lived locally, and state policies can 
either facilitate or hinder these processes”. In Rwanada, the Gacaca courts are 
seen as holding greater promise for reconciliation than the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda because they are based on local models of 
restorative justice (Drumbl, 2000). International organizations like the U.N. 
and the International Center for Transitional Justice acknowledge that any 
transitional justice mechanism must be adapted in response to unique 
circumstances. However, even these adaptations tend be somewhat prescribed 
because they are based on prior knowledge and lessons learned.  
Many authors have elaborated eloquent theories of how both bottom-up 
and top-down approaches are needed if reconciliation is to be achieved. For 
example, Lederach (1997) proposes that we think of leadership in conflict 
populations as a pyramid. At the top, leadership is focused on negotiations 
and cease-fires, and is led by single mediators; middle-range leadership 
includes those working in respected education, religious, ethnic and 
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humanitarian sectors on problem-solving and conflict resolution; grassroots 
leaders are locals, who work on grassroots training, prejudice reduction and 
psychosocial work. Afzali and Colleton (2003) classify different paradigms of 
coexistence projects: those that focus on dispute resolution and conflict 
management, social services, income-generating projects, and reconciliation 
projects. They point out that there are numerous ways to promote coexistence, 
each targeting different audiences. They, too, distinguish between top- and 
bottom-level approaches: “As top-down efforts resolve the fundamental 
political and legal concerns, bottom-up efforts can provide vital reinforcement 
and actualization of coexistence on a more immediate and more personal 
level” (Afzali and Colleton, 2003, p. 15). Johan Galtung (2001, p. 19) outlines 
twelve unique approaches to reconciliation, including the juridical/punishment 
and historical/truth commission approach, but points out that, “taken singly, 
none of the approaches is capable of handling the complexity of the ‘after 
violence situation.’”  
My intention is not to reiterate their work, but to suggest that their 
insight – the importance of including multiple levels of reconciliation 
approaches – is lost when national scale policies are implemented and carried 
out. The following questions need to be addressed prior to implementation of 
large-scale national policies: How will state level mechanisms work in tandem 
with local activists and culturally accepted reconciliation mechanisms? How 
will the government support initiatives that integrate national transitional 
justice policies with local community outreach and support local 
organizations? To what degree will the international community support these 
efforts? 
Effective implementation of national policies relies on grassroots 
efforts; even the best-planned national programs need local partners. Local 
NGOs are best able to deal with the challenges posed by the uniqueness of 
different communities. In Croatia, NGOs “have helped create a public space 
for a public debate on the human rights abuses in the country” (Cruvellier and 
Valiñas, 2006, p. 27). For instance, The Center for Peace, Osijek, a non-profit 
organization, has provided legal advice to over 36,000 clients since opening in 
1993. Because they operate at the societal level, their lawyers have a level of 
knowledge about specific populations that even the best-designed state run 
programs, or even a large international NGO would not be able to achieve. 
Their work has provided the voice of advice in the region on legal matters, 
including on complex amnesty laws that kept many Serbs from returning to 
the area. They also helped write the legislation for the creation of a 
government funded legal aid service.  
As a group, and as Kosic and Byrne (this volume) note, NGOs in 
Croatia face substantial problems (particularly in the Slavonia region), 
including lack of governmental support, lack of know-how (in terms of 
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running an effective and efficient NGO), lack of funds, and public skepticism. 
Problems of segregation, intense competition among organizations, and 
corruption also exist. Disagreements between Serb and Croat associations also 
pose a serious problem (Cruvellier and Valiñas, 2006). Of these four the most 
critical issue is lack of support from the Croatian government. “State funding 
for NGO development declined sharply, from approximately E3 million in 
2001 to E2.3 million in 2002 and remained at E2.3 million in 2003” 
(Stabilization and Association Report, 2003). The NGO Youth Peace Group 
Danube had the opportunity to participate in a government-sponsored 
dialogue that resulted in an agreement on the part of the government to 
implement a youth policy called the National Action Plan for Young People in 
2003, comprised of 110 measures. As of summer 2005, only one of these 
measures had been financed, though others were supposedly in the process of 
implementation (interview with author, 1 July 2005).  
Many of the NGO workers I spoke with commented on the lack of 
governmental recognition of the important services they provide as well as an 
overall lack of rhetorical support. An employee from the NGO Europe House 
Vukovar said that the government does not seem to be conscious of the 
important role that NGOs play (interview with author, 24 June 2005). A 
project coordinator at another NGO had a more cynical view: “They [the 
government] produced the war, they produced the trauma, and now they 
manipulate the trauma” (interview with author, 28 July 2005). Those 
organizations that attempt to work towards reconciliation face the very 
difficult task of trying to prove their worth. An NGO worker from the Nansen 
Dialogue Center illustrated this point when he explained that those 
organizations that fund the re-building of houses get to point to a structure 
when they are finished and say, “I built that”. The resulting product for those 
working on reconciliation is often difficult to recognize or quantify.  
 A U.N. report titled Lessons Learned (1998, p. 39) regarding the 
United Nations’ Transitional Authority for Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES) 
mission states: “The civil society [sic] in countries in conflict are an 
important mechanism for national reconciliation and the United Nations 
needs to establish early dialogue and cooperation with them and where 
possible strengthen them”. In spite of this, the experience of many NGOs is 
that while U.N. Agencies claim to engage in dialogue with the NGOs, they do 
not actually do so. Rather, they take on an attitude of superiority which is 
most often not based on good grassroots contact (Tauber, 2009).  
Dusanka Ilić, President of The Bench We Share Association offers an 
example of how NGOs can directly facilitate reconciliation. She has 
personally led and/or organized hundreds of groups from local communities 
where individuals from diverse backgrounds come together again and talk. 
While this is an ideal situation for promoting reconciliation, it will never be 
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feasible on a national scale unless there is broad base support from both the 
government and the international community. Tauber (2009) recalls that at 
one point in 1997, the Croatian government made an agreement with 
UNTAES to do this but after a few meetings the scheme quickly died.  
The international community could help to overcome some of these 
problems by encouraging capacity building measures and education programs 
(Zoglin, 2005). Fletcher and Weinstein’s (2004, p. 43) research in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina found that international trials need to “support the development 
of parallel teaching and rehabilitative structures addressed to domestic 
audiences. In this manner, international trials might contribute to achieving 
justice in its broadest sense. However, this potential has remained largely 
untapped”. When trials are transferred without appropriate training 
mechanisms and community education programs in place, as in Croatia, there 
is a potential to actually undercut the contributions to reconciliation that a 
tribunal could make. In Croatia, there was never a holistic plan for 
reconciliation, no step-by-step plan that sought to address issues of justice, 
promote dialogue and trauma healing. UNTAES did not begin working on 
reconciliation until the last three months of their mission. Tauber states: “I 
have been told by a number of local and international officials that 
reconciliation and trauma healing are ‘peripheral’. The same is true of such 
ideas as restorative justice, which I believe would be highly appropriate in 
these contexts. The point is that these concepts quite simply are off the radar”. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Reconciliation is not a modern phenomenon, but one that can be found 
across all times and places (Borneman, 2003). What are unique are attempts 
at atonement, not at the individual or societal level but on a national scale; 
such efforts are largely applauded internationally. Reconciliation, through the 
use of both trials and truth commissions, is seen as attentive to needs of 
individuals. However, without an explicit plan to engage individuals and their 
communities, these national-scale policies will not result in “trickle-down” 
reconciliation.  
According to Tauber, as well as other professionals in the field, the 
collective recovery from the war in Croatia has been virtually non-existent. 
The real harm caused by Croatia’s failure to address this trauma through 
effective reconciliation mechanisms is the transmission of trauma and 
prejudices to the next generation, and the potential for further violence. 
Scholars who write on trauma believe that, if left unaddressed, the 
ramifications of individual and collective trauma can have severe effects on 
individuals and societies, as well as be passed down from generation to 
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generation (for more on trauma see Lewis-Herman, 1992; Abu-Nimer, 2001; 
Chayes and Minow, 2003; Stover and Weinstein, 2004; Volkan, 1997). 
Currently, high levels of ethnic tension remain in Croatia, and the public is 
still “ill-prepared, ten years after the end of the war, to full face its legacy” 
(Cruvellier and Valiñas, 2006, p. 36). 
Academic interest in reconciliation is an encouraging step towards 
understanding how to eliminate violent conflict. In addition, the promotion 
and use of mechanisms such as international tribunals and truth commissions 
which attempt to achieve reconciliation offer promise that this interest is, with 
increasing frequency, accompanied by action. Practically speaking, however, 
not enough attention has been given to thinking about how state-wide policies 
such as these can best achieve reconciliation. Acknowledging the importance 
of bottom-up approaches and actively soliciting the participation of local 
organizations has enormous potential to improve the success of national-scale 
reconciliation projects.  
The ICTY is set to close in 2010. The possibility for the court to 
contribute to reconciliation over the course of its seventeen years in existence 
was squandered due to a lack of foresight and lack of initiative. National level 
mechanisms must be considered with local level politics in mind. There is 
currently an international expectation of transitional justice in countries 
emerging from violent pasts; as this norm continues to strengthen, it is 
important that one-size-fits-all mechanisms are not advocated or initiated 
simply because they are “supposed to”. Furthermore, national level 
mechanisms must be integrated with grassroots efforts working towards the 
same goals. Grassroots efforts must be appropriately funded and supported 
by both the national government and the international community. The 
academic dialogue on transitional justice revolves around whether or not 
truth commissions and/or trials and tribunals can achieve, or have achieved, 
reconciliation. We now need to widen the discourse in order to pay more 
specific attention to how individual and community level participation – the 
levels on which reconciliation actually needs to occur – can be incorporated 
into these mechanisms. 
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Endnotes 
 
1 Field research was conducted under the guidance of the Dutch-based non-profit 
organization, The Coalition for Work with Psychotrauma and Peace between June 25 
and August 12, 2005.  
2 For example, the United States Institute for Peace Balkans Initiative has a program 
entitled “Bosnian Truth and Reconciliation” that is working towards submitting draft 
legislation to the parliament. It is also important to point out that Serbia and 
Montenegro did establish a truth commission in 2001, but it went largely unnoticed 
and quickly fell apart. The likelihood that Croatia will implement a truth commission 
is very low; a truth commission would demand that Croatians admit a degree of 
complicity in committing atrocities, a position that goes against the Croatian attitude 
toward the war as put forward by Tudman and the leadership of the HDZ and 
promulgated by the media that it was almost a holy war.  
3 General Rahim Ademi, for example in 2001, and former Army Generals Cermak 
and Markac in 2004. In 2004, the government turned over Army General Mirko 
Norac, and facilitated the transfer of seven additional voluntary surrenders to The 
Hague. 
4 Ovčara is the location of a mass gravesite about ten kilometers west of the city of 
Vukovar, where 200 civilians were purportedly taken from the Vukovar Hospital and 
shot in October of 1991 by JNA soldiers. 
5 Gotovinia is accused of responsibility for the murder of 150 Serb civilians and the 
expulsion of 150,000 more in 1995. 
6 Trying perpetrators for War Crimes is the only criminal recourse the Croatian 
government has due to a 1996 law negotiated between the Croatian Department of 
Justice and the Republika Sprska Krajina (RSK) which granted amnesty to all who 
had been sentenced (in absentia) for armed rebellion. 
7 Law on the Implementation of the Statute of the International Criminal Court and 
Criminal Prosecution for Acts against War and Humanitarian International Law.  
8 It is important to point out that the international community should also be held 
responsible to a certain extent. UNTAES had a special ability to begin this process 
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during its two-year presence in Eastern Croatia. Similarly, foreign governments that 
were heavily involved in the region had enough political clout to demand that the 
Croatian government do the same and political entities such as the European Union 
have the unprecedented ability to dictate that Croatia implement such measures even 
today. As important as this is, it is not the central focus of this paper.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
